The decision by the United Ulster unionist Council fuuuu, lasi october io reject any 'power sharing' came as a clear slap in ine tace for ine policies of Mervyn Rees. It marked "ne colanse or ver anoiner stace i :he British: government's attempt to Istabilisel the situation in the Six countles.
Preparations for 'power sharing' had been carefully laid. draw the nationalist community behind the SDLP who had long been seeking collaboration with Unionist Torces, certain concessions welc called for. The phasing out of internment, earlier release for political prisoners and the 'truce' with the Provisionals were all clearly designed to isolate the IRA by showing that reforms were possible.
Such a policy was greatly facilitated by the bitter feud which, recently, nad torn ine republican movement apart. This feud, to 10 dead and over 45 seriously injured, helped demoralise the beleaguerea namonalist areds them sceptical about the ability of the InA to detena Inem trom tre security forces and offensive by the Loyalist para-military groups.
It boosted the 'alternativel of collaboration offered by the SDLP leaders.
Reaction The 'concessions' involved in Rees' policy were expressly designed to isolate the IRA and prepare the ground for a coalition government able to re-establish 'law and order!. the same time as carrots were being dangled, the RUC was being built up and was beginning to intiltrate ine Ino go' areas where, due to nepubresistence was considerably lessened.
Even these minor concessions were, too much tor the unionist block to stomach. Apart from Craig, they were viewed as an attempi to undermine Loyalist supremecy summed up in raisiey's woras I just prior to the May elections for the convention/ as no power-snaring no Irish dimension and the return of the B-specials'.
The escalation in sectarian murders by the Loyalist para-military groups such as the UVF clear warning to Rees that a 'soft' ne would not be toleraleus formal rejection of 'power-sharing' by the UUUC in its convention report was merely an expression of this confident mood.
IContident because ine Loyallsis were no doubt aware that Rees would be unable to challenge them head-on without, at the same time, challenging the very existence of the Six Counties which the government is in there to uphold.
Differences The differences that have emerged between Rees and figures such as Palsley are not, of course.
They represent merely a clash on the most effective way of crushing the nationalist upsurge and reimoosing the status quo within ine Six Counties. Tactically, however, thev are a serious set-back lu British government policy.
The Rees initiative was a caretu 6 months. £1.00 12 months. • 82.00 vame..
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c'oD. MacLeod, 1 Pretoria Road, sW16 Dave MacLeod In order to Isuic.
until leading ions, and crushed. and make Rees' lines, forces tough'.
continue in ine montis At IRA.
Order In making Unionists, in 1969. ou vears.
which is torced. basic.
Six Counties.
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head-on without hold.
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The British left has fallen into one of three camps. They either have taken the position that there are excesses within the British army; or they move to critical support of the Irish struggle; or they move to a position of victory to then IRA with a complete lack of understanding as to the reality of the situation. And I think it can be said that the British left's attitude to Ireland has been opportunHaving worked with 15 and the IMG the objective test is to ask whether either organisation has succeeded in making, attempt to woo the minority in the ghettoes, through minimal concessinto a sham 'power-sharing' so that the IRA could be isolated The wude, with the notable exception of Craig who has become converted to a formula along are pushing firmly for a confrontation with nationalist This is the meaning of Paisley's call to the army to 'get The debate within the unionist block is obviously not finished and will ahead. Craig's position of a sham coalition (granting a few token seats to SDLP leaders in a future cabinet) has already gainIt is obviously supported as the 'voice of reason' Westminster who tear ine policies of the hard-liners could push the minority back into the arms of the While supporting Craig, and noping that time will allow him to convince the majority of the UUUC of the need for a more 'sensitivel approach, Rees has meantime been torced to make concessions to hard-line opinion to ward off a potential backlash. The 'incident' centres (a means of communication with the Provisionals during the truce) have been closed, the right to political status by republican prisoners wiinarawn and narassmen of the nationalist areas stepped up.
concessions to nara-iine Rees is, ot course. merely treading the well-worn track of his predecessors trom whiteraw pack to Callaghan who introduced the troops Rees may talk about wishing to restore lorder! but the order that he and his predecessors have tried to restore is that based on the bigotry and privileges of the Loyalist state which has discriminated against the nationalist minority for over This has inevitably turned the army into the main repressive torce against the nationalist community by the very nature of its struggle for democratic rights, to challenge the status quo in the The constant arrests, murder and torture - and.
open collaboration of the army with Loyalist para-military groups - has burnt this indelibly on the minds of the nationallst It has also burnt it on the minds of the unionist block which is only too aware that tne britisn government will not challenge inell allies undermining the status quo they are there to upThe back-down of Wilson betore the uster workers strike in March last year was a concrete Such knowledge obviously gives the Unionists increased contidence in pressing to defend their caste In this sense, the presence of the British army in the Six Counties has always been the lynchpin to the by acuing as ine mall repressive force against the struggle by the minority for their democratic rights, it constantly encourages the Unionist block to ever more sectaridi positions and threatens the possibility of a right-wing back-lash.
The fact that it is the British army in any section of the British working class, a contribution to any understanding of the Irish problem. The answer is that they 39 into britain Ever since the introduction of the present immigration Act, in 1973 overseas students nave been tacec with ever stricter control on entry To get past immigration officers, thev have to orovide evidence of both high academic ability and of their financial situation stretchinc back for years.
Even when they provide the required evidence, they can still be rejected by the immigration otticers who are vested with the power to deny them entry despite their lack of competence to make 'academic!
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