those forces inside NAC who wished to link up the campaign with other issues.
By suggesting that only those who were willing to support a whole variety of issues Cocon e were effectively slamming the door on masses of women who were ready to struggle against abortion restrictions but who were not yet at a level to grasp the other points.
Boln ine retormists & the sectarians join hands, in inis sense.
agreement that, whatever happens, real change will come about not through the independent action of masses of people demanding their rights but the manoeuvres of a few MPs or by small 'elitist' actions (such as those organised by the left in the anti-NF campaign). In both cases, people are reduced to the passive role or spectators.
Government One of the main achievements of NAC was to force the government to 'drop!
the White Bill. by mobilising action on the streets - and winning support from the TUC and Labour forced the government to temporarily retreat on its most extreme measures against abortion rights brought in under SPUC pressure.
Mobilising mass action on the streets is not only, nowever, way of creating a viable opposition to anti-democratic moves by the government. " also. by taking ever - wider layers into struggle around a concrete objective, increasingly reveals to them the true nature of class society raises their consciousness.
Many groups on the left, IMG, have maintained that directing such mass action against the government can alually create lusions in Farliament as a body for social change. Such an arguement only reveals an inability to grasp the dynamic of mass action.
The mass of people already possess illusions in Parliament - if they didn't ine lett would not silli occupy the 'peripheral' place it does. building mass action in the streets -and demanding that the government respond to such actior more will begin, through their experience, to realise of Parliament and see the motor force for social change in their own indepcluen action.
It is, of course, possible that in the course of such action concessions will be won. Mass action in the USA led for example, to the legalising of abortion and to the withdrawing of troops from Vietnam in the early seventies. To maintain that such concessions could lead to creating 'illusions' in Parliament is as ridiculous as claiming that winning 'wage concessions' through strike action will lead to creating illusions in private enterprise.
On the contrary, winning will only give wide layers confidence in their own ability to change the situation without reliance upon the manoeuvres of MPs. It is by gaining such confidence that such layers will we stimuldled to struggle turtner tor other demands through class-struggle methods which will deepen their understanding of class society and the need for fundamental change.
Une of the basic errors of the left, particularly of young radicals, is to Delieve that struggles must be posed ar vuna demands wich cannot be What these radicals tend to misunderstand is that whether a demand is or not is purely a question of the relationship of forces in most cases. What differentiates a On January 12th, in common government of Angola.
At the same time either by MPLA, Angola and those Ine mass or African assistence.
African backed MPLA -rary - NAU per sudde Key 'unity talks'. the most effective Jane ibian borders such as the raids. Such a move was It is by own une mitations Mercenaries demands stage, La 'direct' way.
04 l0 44 votes the fact that their been tied, however, at an emergency meeting of the Organisation of African unity tal nela in Addis Ababa, African states supported the Nigerian resolution calling tor the recognition of the MPLA as the sole "legitimate' as recognising the many of them condemned the 'agressive' policy of South Africa in 'UNIT A' and the FNLA, nationalist which had, in CroUDs. the internal civil war, invited South The decision by large numbers of states to recognise the Sovietstemming specifically, in the case of Nigeria and Ghana, as a result of South African intervention -came as a serlous sel-back tor the aims of US Imperialism in Angola. was a slap in the face for Kissingerls attempts (through the 'African tour! of his envoy William. E. Shaufele)to African governments to drop their support for the MPLA and adopt the US position on the need for The rebuff suffered at the OAU conf troops to within 60 miles of the Namprotect the Cuneme dam & to prevent SWAPO guerrillas from conducting what remains of its 'detentel policy with neighbouring states. were being forced to modify their attitude towards the MPLA meant that any only served to isolate South Africa The 'pull back' of South African troops to 'defensive' positions near allowed the MPLA to step ensive ever more forcefully. In the north, it has managed to rout FNLA forces (taking such key towns as Uige) and push them over the border into Zair A forces hard and seemssikely In the south, it is pressing to capture in the near future such Can a twas as Ivovo Meamonda.
The removal of S. African troops to the borders of Namibia must clearly worry the Ford administration which, busy collecting mercenaries from both the USA and Europe. On January 11, the Sunday Telegraph besides an estimated 300 American mercenaries.
European mercenaries have entered Angola secretly over the last few monins'.
Dominoes The real reasons for do not stem, as Kissinger maintain, from the direct threat of a marxist 'take-over! in Angola which could topple the 'dominos! of Southern Africa. The MPLA is not a marxist movement. Agostinho Neto, MPLA leader, has openly pointed out that !!
dislike these classifications. I am not a Communist, am first of all a patriot!.
Far from being a 'marxist' movement, the MPLA has guaranteed the US and oner foreign investors such as Britair (which has over £2000m in Angola) that it will respect private property and has been ready, occasiona to put down strikes and independent working class activity. the present moment it is confronted with mass walk-outs, in Luanda, leatners. electricians, bakers servants and mechanics. attitude towards this can be detected in a speech made by Neto on December z0th when he inaicated inat the fight against UNITA and the FNLA must be accompanied by what he termed 'the battle or production. labour, for productivity, laziness, accinsI idleness, sabotage of our rear lines!.
The Ford administration is only too aware that the MPLA is no more a marxist movement than is the FNLA or UNITA which have both, guaranteed to respect foreign investment and who have adopted clear anti-working class stands. to intervene in Angola is motivated by other reasons. 'Detente Writing in the Guardian on January 9th, Jonathan , Steel pointed out what he considered to be the behind the US moves. that. while the MPLA was no marxist movement, it was supported in the Imucedues! (townships)
Angola's biggest industrial base, workers whose radical aspirations ANGOLA reported that, such 'activity' likes to leaders.
I am not a socialist. 1 example, nstrations leaders on more than one At by influence of civil The MPLA's The the battle of could give the against against the 'detente!. equally, allow the _ine cecision Out Now rcar molves The first was to stabilise of Luanda, by Christian 50g. -Holden Roberto (INLA). and Jonas savimb: :".:
have often caused problems for v=._ i After the downfall of Caetaro, the Luanda workers e gass.
in a powerful series of strikes, demo -taking them considerably to the left of the MPLA.
who tried to • DU Inem coas An MPLA 'victory! could lead to se-ious pressures being placed UDor which could force it to adopt more 'radical' positions.
The second was that a united Angola, rich and relatively removed from the South Africa, would be more independent its actions and could provide aid to SWAPO guerrillas. Creating conflict in Namibia could be a serious threat to the 'detentel line South Africa has been trying to build over the past period with US help.
third (and possibly most vital) was the fear that an MPLA victory Soviet Union, which is backing the MPLA with supplies and with 'troops' via Cuba, a very useful bargaining counter in its diplomatic moves with the West within terms of A USSR-backed regime, rich in natural resources and with massive Imperialist investment, would Soviet bureaucrats to make 'gains' within the policy of detente.
US intervention in Angola is not so much motivated by fear of a marxist take-over - it is only too the USSR is not there to foster the aims of revolution - but by a desire • Southern Africa and keep it within 'its! sphere of influence. It no doubt calculated that to have three squabbling facts was more conducive to this aim than to have a political victory for one of them.
Even though they have been unable to intervene 'openly' (due to the dec-