IMGpapers 1976–79

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1976–79

THE COMING ELECTIONS

· Socialist Action (League for Socialist Action) Vol. 1, No. 3, 1976 · p. 5 of the scan · 782 words

The scan: Socialist Action v1 no3 apr 1976.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 3-4 of 5; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 5 of the scan

in Portugal and Socialist Parties democratic system'.

That claim no aganda line of sign a new Dacl.

to its role political life.

Retreat it is true, Trom earler proposals.

can offer demands.

accrees.

For this matters.

body to the president...'.

Safeguard on its former or else 1o for decisions.

coup, in 1974, State order.

Pat Brain or leaders.

Miner attacks on CDS On February 26th, the major parties - including ine Communis signed a new Witn une Armed Forces Movement (AFM). According to New York Times Correspondant Marvin Howe, the new pact was designed to end '.. military rule and establish a doubt echoes the propthe military and of its 'allies'. It is clearly false. If the AFM wanted to withdraw from politics, would do so without obliging the parties - from the CDS to the CP - to The very fact that new formal agreement between the AFM and the parties has been imposed tends to show that the military Is hanging on as 'arbiter! in Portuguese The provisions of the new pact show La major retreat by the AFM •A rebor_ on the pact negotiations of January 16th, for example, indicated that the military were demanding that the office of president be reserved for an armed forces commander. According to this scheme, the president was to have the power to declare war and make peace, proclaim a state of serge or emergency, and dissolve the legislative assembly.

With the approval of the Council of the Revolution, the leading body of the AFM, the president would also have had veto powers over all legislation concerning economic, social and tinancial policy Under the new agreement, the Council has abandoned many ot these earlier As Marvin Howe points out, it has 'abdicated its powers to veto the choice of president, to define the broad lines of domestic and toreign policy, 1o rule on the constitutionality of laws & an a lo lecisiate in civillar The Council will function, the tuture, essentially as an aavisory Although this represents a 'retreat' positions, ine military may very well believe that it will be able to manage Portuguese politics more effectively, at this stage, from a formal position as 'advisor' than from one of being directly responsible In the months following the Caetano the ArM was forced to assume direct control of the situation. The mass upsurge and the weakness of the bourgeois parties ( the CDS & the PPD*) left the leaders of the AFM suspended virtually in mid-air. They had to try and ride out the 'radicalisation' while retaining the essential underpinnings of capitalism and bourgeois They undertook this 'task' mainly by involving the various workers' parties, over the years, in coalition governments wnose main inrust was to hold back the ground-swell in working class activity. The disastrous policies of the CP and acting as a civilian facade for the AFM, did the trick. Not only have democratic rights and living standards confused their own foll -= Portuguese CP leader: Cunhal.

eged ally', they have been prepared :: champion attacks on the economic ga-: and rights won by the mass movemer: ine period atter ine 1914 Laetano co-While they have been prepared to ope suborainate inemselves to ine milliar almost 0% orphe pour ten Ins way • despite the fact that the: year's elections - the right has H^'=s=: up a large campaign tor democral se ernment' which has won growing s-s= ne Arm's decision to retire' .. sidelines is based precisely on a awareness or ine contusion anc.. isation in the workers' mover eis eaders pollcies couplec .. upsurge in the fortunes of tne !? e no doubt hopes that such a trend, continues, will provide a favorab!e context tor ine gradual restoratio s bourgeois 'law and order':

Election In such a situation, it is more impor:ant inan ever inal socialists interver: to provide an alternative strategy. T-= election period could be very profitat used to • call upon the mass reformis; parties to break their alliance with:-= 'progressivel military and to campaig in unity, around a socialist programme based on the needs of working people i their allies among the poor peasants.

Such a programme should not mere: take up workers' economic interests balso their democratic rights which the CDS and other right-wing parties ha: e Skiltully used to build up a mass base but to which they are, in reality, quite opposed.

Campaigning for unity in the workers movement around a clear programme -& demanding that the reformist leader: torm a workers government to impleme that programme - would find a positive response in the labour movement whichas still not suffered any major defea:=

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by Tony Roberts

← PROGRAMME TO FIGHT UNEMPLOYMENTWorkers' Unity →

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