The political instability & rising social turmoil in capitalist Europe has been (equally) unnerving to the American rulers. That continent is where American foreign policy, which included colossal material aid under the Marshall Plan, had supposedly worked a post - World War I! 'miracle', creating the strongest concentration of satellite powers. Now, even the most optimistic official spokesmen recognise the depth of the growing social crisis of European capitalism.
Instead of moving towards Common Market unity, which would re-inforce stability Western Europe is moving towards greater dis -sharpening competition and increasing social unrest. The strongest countries like Germany grow at the expense of the weaker ones like Italy. But the crises of the weaker threaten to pull down the entire edifice.
The very things the American rulers need most seem to be slipping away. The prospect of a confident, stable capitalist Europe governed by strong bourgeois parties that can be counted on sharing more and more of the burden of policing the world & picking up the tab for the armaments rudget - that's a fading vision. Not since the consolidation of their victory in World War Il have America's rulers been faced by so grim a perspective.
It is worth taking a closer look at developments in Europe, along with the spectre of 'Communist power'. What is behind this great fear? What is behind the drumbeating of Kissinger and his colleagues that they will not accept Communist parties in the governments of major capitalist countries Behind the bellicose rhetoric, the truculant diplomacy, the sabre-rattling for electoral purposes, there are two elements of prominent importance for understanding what is happening in Europe today and the implications of these elopments for the class struggle in the United States and elsewhere. One is the depth of the social crisis in Europe which is more reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s than anything we have seen The other is the advancing disintegration is vulnerability of world Stalinism. TradeWar First, we have to estimate the economic and social crisis and the resultant radicalisation of important sections of the European working class. This is partially a result of one of the important successes of American foreign policy - the economic offensive begun in 1971 with the Nixon Conolly wage freeze, the wage cut-back campaign and the foreign trade offensive, an offensive that was carried forward during the oil crisis & the 1974-75 depression. This tough economic policy which brought substantiai victories to the American ruling class vis-a-vis its Italian, French & British competitors, has had some other results as well. The very success of the American monopolists has deepened the social crisis in these countries.
On the Lis side, in order to attain the capitalists economic goals, the Nixon offensive meant reversing the few social concessions of the 1960s. Their administrators probed to see what level of unemployment they could get away with. To their amazement, they pushed it to 10% with no big kick-backs. They probed to see what kind oi cut-backs they could engineer, to see how big an increase in military spending they could push through. They have been successful beyond their fondest hopes. Such progress on the domestic front allowed them to step up the attack on their business rivals abroad.
The two competitive devaluations of the dollar plus the use of food produced by the giant uS agribusiness monopolies as an economic, political and social weapon have yielded some surprising results in the world trade offensive.
The Economist last April, summarising one of the key results of this offensive, said: "In terms of the floating dollar, America's wage costs plus fringe benefits are no longer much higher than those of workers in northern Europe. Sometimes they are lower; in mid - 1975, hourly labour costs for employing an American shipworker were $ 7.06 against $8.07 for Swede and $ 7. 46 for a German".
The same trends are noticeable auto. Of course, this shift shouldn't be exaggerated. The wage gap between the United States & its rivals has certainly not been eliminated. But what seemed only a dream to the American ruling class a decade ago is within reach.. In several major industries, wage levels may well be lower in the US than in some European counThe same Economist article explained anot! er disadvantage facing capitalist enterprises based in Europe. "Job security laws and customs in Europe are an even greater grouse. During a • slump, American companies lay off workers to cut output & reduce wage bills. Most American employees are on contracts that permit a single weeks! notice. The unions co-operate in picking the men who will be given dismissal slips; those laid off are rehired when demand picks up again. American workers with the longest service get their jobs back first. Such economic Darwinism is an historical curiosity in most European countries"....
These are some of the reasons for the tremendous success of the American employers' national and international economic offensive that began in 1970 and accelerated during the oil crisis & the world recession. It is all based on the
the bosses were able to carry through their drive against the real wages, working conditions and standards of living of the American working class with minimal resistance The third big headache is the role of the United States itself. What sort of political help can the US rulers give?
It is useful to recall what American imperialism