In late September, lan Smiih announced acceptance of 'black majority rule' in Zimbabwe within a space of two years. He also made it clear, in the same statement, that the plan was only agreed to by the white settler regime under considerable pressure. As he put it, referring to the intervention of Dr Kissinger and his ally Premier Vorster, ".. they had us in a nut-crackers".
Certainly, the press made much of Kissinger's diplomatic 'coup' in forcing the Smith regime to accept a plan which it had resoiutely opposed tor the previous decade. They also made much of the United States 'change of policy' in Zimbabwe to one of 'championing' the rights of the oppressed black majority.
In reality, of course, Kissinger's pressure on Smith represented anything bui concern for the rights of the Zimbabwean people (io wiiom a conveniently blind eye had been turned in Washington as in London during the years of UDI). His urgent meetings with Vorster in late July and August had one aim and one aim only: to create an 'orderly! settlement in Zimbabwe that could cut across the escalating liberation struggles.
ANGOLA ZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE RHODESIA NAMIBIA (SOUTNA-ST AFRICA)
BOTSWANA - SWAZILAND LESOTHO SOUTH AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA POET FURABATM Angola The pressure on the white settler regime in Zimbabwe to reach a 'negotiated settlement' was not, of course, new. It stemmed basically from a re-adjustment in policy in Washington - and its ally in Pretoria - after their defeat at the hands of the freedom fighters of the MPLA in Angola in early 1976.
The MPLA regime that emerged from the civil war in Angola, in which both American and South African troops had intervened on the side of the FNLA and UNITA, remains a capitalist regime which has since directed heavy attacks on the militant workers of Luanda, radicals and national minorities. Despite its neo-colonial character, however, its willingness to co-operate with the giant US combines such as Shell oil, the winning Africa that led to Geneva.
of political independence constitutes a powerful and important advance for the liberation struggle throughout southern Africa.
The shock waves that spread from the Angolan victory could be felt particularly strongly in Zimbabwe. They led to a major surge forward in the liberation struggle as thousands of youth began to leave for the 'training camps' in neighbouring Mozambique & Zambia and the guerrilla activity sharply increased.
As early as April last year, according to the Sunday Times, about "1, 000 guerril!as tave iow infiltrated across the border and the area of operations, once confined to the north-east, now extends to the south-west. In addition to those guerrillas fighting in Zimbabwe, another 3, 000 in Mozambique were reported ready for action and, in Tanzania and Zambia, a further 10, 000 to 20,000 were estimated to be in training.
Race War It soon became clear to Washington, as the guerrilla action mounted, that only a 'controlled' transfer to majority black rule could possibly prevent Zimbabwe being plunged into a mounting The fear of such a war was not merely that it would threaten imperialist interests in Zimbabwe itself but that it could easily !spill over! into the whole southern continent, particularly into South Africa where the major imperialist powers have massive investments. American firms, for example, had over $ 1.2 billion invested there in 1975 & British investment exceeds even that.
Worse still, the growth of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe and other white strongholds could possibly begin to break out of the 'controlling' influence exerted over it by the various Black capitalist states such as Zambia, Botswana & Mozambique and take a more soc¡ally radical direction, It was, after all, only the influence of these governments that had forced the four liberation groups - ZAPU, the ANC, ZANU and Frolizi# - into a united movement and had pressurised them to 'open! talks with the Smith regime for a settlement.
It was even possible that not only would the liberation movement break out of the control of the Black capitalist states but would also spark off internal struggles against the governments of these countries seeking a 'compromise with the white racist regimes. A foretaste of this possibility had already been seen in January of last year when Zambia's Kaunda imposed a Istate of emergencyl to intensify repression against students and others who were protesting Zambials collaboration with South Africa in Angola.
Carrot & Stick Forcing Smith to adopt the principle of Black majority rule was, therefore, a central plank in maintaining the status quo in southern Africa (and protecting imperialism's interests there). Pressure was placed on Smith - both in London and Washington - to negotiate with the liberation forces to this effect.
A negotiated settlement, it was acutely noted by the Economist, would enable the West to influence "... the scope of the franchise which will help to decide what sort of men will lead the first majority rule government". What the Economist was stressing, of course, was the hope that the West could install a 'moderatel. Black regime - no doubt led by the Nomo faction of the ANC - which would prove itself loyal to imperialism's interests.
In order to force Smith to the negotiating table, they applied both financial inducements to the white settlers and the threat that, in the event of a mounting race war, they could rely on no outside assistance. Even Vorster was forced, despite opposition from his own Nationalist Party at home, to warn Smith: "Under no circumstances could it (South Africa) commit its army to defence of Rhodesia..".
Despite the carrot and stick treatment, Smith stood firm, doubtless aware that even a moderate Black government would initiate a process whereby the white settlers would lose most of their privileges. His reply was to prepare for. a long drawn-out war with the liberation army. From the end of 1975 until August 1976, a campaign of intimidation and terror was launched against the Black majority. along the Mozambique border was declared a Ino gol zone in which anyone could be Blacks were arrested on suspicion of terrorism, tortured and thousands more were subject to 'forcible resettlement' plans along the borders to separate them from the infiltrAs the February Washington Post put it, the 'protected villages' into which they were herded were little better than concentration camps based on the 'strategic hamlet' principle by the US in Vietnam to 'protect' the population.
The explosive implications of Smith's course were soon readily apparent. Not only did the guerrilla action in Zimbabwe increase but it began to spread beyond the borders. In June, on an alleged 'anti-guerrilla' raid, Rhodesian security forces violated Mozambique territory, thus confirming the 'spill-over! effect Kissinger & Even more disturbing was the impact of this struggle within South Africa itself. The Soweto riots which developed in late summer & which spread through the Black townships - involving, significantly enough, the two million strong coloured population - added to the dangers of the situation facing imperialism.
The appearance of mass riots on the streets of Soweto and other main townships was a severe blow to the strategy applied up to then by the South African regime (with the backing of both London and Washington). This strategy, often called the Lusaka strategy, was an attempt by South Africa to win the support of the neighbouring Black states in curbing the liberation struggles in exchange for massive aid and investment grants. Through such a policy, it was no doubt hoped to 'buy! security by binding the Black states economically to South Africa and making them dependent on her.
The Soweto riots - reflecting the general rise of the liberation struggle in the southern continent - was a severe blow to this policy. It threatened to force the neighbouring Black states - adapting to the widespread sympathy in their own countries with the Black South Africans - to develop a more hostile attitude which could potentially isolate her.
Danger There was, however, an even greater danger implicit in the mass riots that began to engult South Africa last summer. The struggles that had developed in Angola & Mozambique, while winning political independence from imperialist rule, were still dominated economically by the giant US combines. Parties such as the MPLA remain bourgeois nationalist movements which, when in power, have been anxious to woo the US combines such as Shell Oil and have been ready to use armed force against radical workers who want to destroy imperialist economic as well as political control over their country.
The riots that began in South Africa held within them a potentially more radical character than in any other country in the southern continent since they were predominantly proletarian in character.
The expansion of the South African economy since the middle 150s has brought on the scene a working class more than 6 million strong in which the Black Africans are an integral - and expanding - sector. This fact carries within it a particular danger since the struggle against the apartheid system there is more and more pursued through 'proletarian! methods of class struggle. This can be seen most clearly in the increase in strikes that has developed in the early '70s as Black workers, tasting the new power increasingly strategic cole played by the Black workers in the South African economy means that the struggle against white supremacy can - at any time - very easily become linked
and inter - related with a struggle against the capitalist system itself.
Inner Dynamic The logic of this development could be seen most clearly in the Soweto upsurge. It began around a limited issue that applied to a few junior high schools: the imposition of the Afrikaan language. A student strike, starting in some of the schools, ended in a mass rally that brought out over 10,000.
The brutality of the Security Forces dealing with the rally brought thousands more workers and students out onto the streets in rebellion against the racist regime. They tried to assert control of the streets in a week of battles with the South African armed forces. The rebellion spread to the Black communities where day-long strikes were called and demonstrations organised around the slogan 'Power to Soweto!.
From a student struggle against one aspect of racist discrimination, the movement widened to bring millions of Africans into struggle calling for power to be placed into the hands of those to whom it belongs - into the hands of the Black working masses. The inner dynamic of such a process - in which the struggle against aspects of apartheid merged into one challenging the very nature of the regime - presented a direct threat to Imperialism. It was this threat, above all else, which led to the scramble of negotiations' between Kissinger, Vorster and Smith in late August of this year.
What was seen to be at risk in the Soweto uprising was not merely 'white supremacyl but also the very nature of the system in Africa which protected imperialism's interests Weaknesses The pressure applied to Smith in August and September to reach a negotiated settlement must have been severe. At the same time, however, he was probably beginning to realise the impossibility of cortinuing his holding operation' in the teeth of opposition from Washington and Pretoria. Military operations against the growing guerrilla threat were proving inneffectual; the economy was under a severe strain and -worse still - emigration among white settlers was increasing as demoralisation set in.
While forcing Smith to the conference table, however, Kissinger's proposed deal is designed to pave the way for a 'moderatel majority rule government which will not threaten, in any way, the economic power left in the hands of the white settlers and their economic backers. He is facilitated in this task - of setting up a 'neo-colonial' state in Zimbabwe - precisely by the internal weaknesses in the liberation movement itself. These weaknesses can be detailed a) The continuation of tribalism and sectionalism among the leadership which has led to numerous Irifts! often settled by the gun. b) The lack of any independent political line by the liberation movement - particularly the guerrillas - which could offer any real perspective of struggle for the urban population. c) The continued strangle-hold retained over the liberation movement by the 'front-line!
neo-colonial regimes who are more concerned with their relations with South Africa & the West than with the Zimbabwean struggle itself.
Kissinger obviously hopes to take advantage of these weaknesses. By playing off the rival factions, and by trading on the support of the neo-colonial regimes like Mozambique & Zambia who want to renew the policy of 'detentel with South Africa, he hopes to ensure a 'moderate' majority rule government controlled by figures such as Nkomo and Muzorewa. Socialist Strategy While Kissinger may be able to impose a deal in Zimbabwe, the prospects for imperialism and white racist rule in southern Africa as a whole are bleak. The collapse in Angola of Portuguese imperialism, the failure of South Africa's so-called 'detentel policy, the mass riots that took place in Soweto and the acceptance by Smith of majority rule are indications of a dynamic now opening up.
Such mighty events in themselves, however, are insufficient to bring liberation. The outcome of the struggle in Angola, for example, has been the creation of a Black capitalist state eager to co-exist with the white racist regimes & to use arms against radical workers. What has happened in Angola is true of a great number of African countries where Black majority rule and formal independence has occurred. In spite of undoubted dedication to the struggles, these regimes have ended up defending imperialist property and crushing attempts by the working masses of these countries to fight back against patterns of exploitation sui wider colonialism. It is likely, if Kissinger's deal succeeds over the next two years, that a similar process may occur in Zimbabwe.
In order to achieve real liberation in Africa - liberation for the majority of Black people -what is needed is a strategy of socialist revolution. This is not a question of using a little Isocialist! rhetoric as do many of the leaders of the liberation forces (such as the MPLA). It is a question of mobilising the mass of workers & peasants in a real struggle to destroy not just imperialism's political but also economic power by nationalising all its holdings.
In southern Africa, today, such a strategy means complete independence for the liberation forces from the neo-colonial regimes in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. Fighters for independence in Namibia, South Africa and, of course, Zimbabwe, should see their main allies in these countries as the mass of workers and peasants and not the governments who have refused to break from imperialist domination, who have failed to cure poverty or grant elementary democratic rights.
Indispensable to their task is the need to construct a revolutionary marxist party. Many people assumed that the guerrilla movements in Angola and Mozambique - or even Zimbabwe today - were sufficient to lead to a socialist state. In reality, of course, all these forces ended up as accomplices of imperialism since they refused to base their struggle on mobilising the masses of workers and peasants around a series of demands which would destroy both the economic and political domination of imperialism - and its Isupporters! among the Black capitalists themselves. Such a party can play a decisive role in winning genuine liberation through socialism in southern Africa.
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PETER MARAIS analyses the back~ ground to developments in Southern
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