at home generally kept their gloves on.
lies the repressive apparatus of the state.
This is the starting point for Tony Bunyan's study of The Political Police in Britain, * the first detailed account of the history and practice of the secret police. His examination of the Official Secrets Acts and "D notice system shows why we know so little about the Special Branch, M15 and M16. His investigations into the workings of these agencies shows that they know a lot more about some of us than we would imagine.
It came as no surprise to Bunyan that the Secretary of the 'D' notice Committee (whose job is to prevent publication of anything 'not in the national interest') tried to obtain a copy before publication - obviously with a view to censoring it.
The information Bunyan gives is a powerful argument against those who prefer to believe that Britain has no 'political' police. BUT BRIS IS something that most political activists, trade union militants, blacks usd Irish people know already. For bem, Bunyan's intention is to provide information on precisely those aspects which may lead to an everyday knowledge of the activities and practices' of the political polThroughout its rise and fall as a dominant imperialist power, the British ruling class has dealt with internal political threats in a highly sophisticated fashion. Political groups and demonstrations have only rarely been banned; torture of political opponents is almost unhead-of. While the British security forces slaughtered and tortured in the colonies, their counterparts For most of this time the ruling class has been able to use the crumbs of its imperialist achievements in order to erect a facade of liberal democracy centred on Parliament. But behind this facade, protected by secrecy, are also known to work with their OveIseas CounterDarts. such as ule CIA and the South African BOSS.
There is one area in which the Branch has consistently operated: industrial unrest. After the dock strikes of the late 1940s, for example, it set up a special squad to find the ringleaders - suspected of being 'Communist infiltrators'.
Files In the Strachan's dispute in 1973, the Branch again uncovered 'infiltrators" - this time the International Socialists. puted to keep files on over two million people, and regularly photographs demonstrations and pickets.
There are two key features of the Branch's operations in industry.
The first is its willingness to work with any sympathetic individuals or organisations - including informers, employers, trade union leaders and right-wing bodies such as the Economic League. After the 1940s dock strikes, for instance, the Branch gave information to Deakin, General Secretary of the T&GWU, which enabled him to witch-hunt a militant out of the union. The Branch is remonitored wage claims, recruited student informers, and even kept Labour MPs under surveillance on suspicion of being fellow travellers of the Communist Party.
mentary action in the 1960s posed the whole police force ially the secret police - with new problems. It became clear that the scope and variety of dissent was such that they could not simply respond in an ad-hoc fashion. What was needed was a plan which would enable all security forces to operate in coordination but with flexibility.
National Security Plan (NSP) is very This oper- interesting, because it shows how closely political events and changes are linked with changes in the security forces. As Bunyan points out, the background to the NSP is the world recession. As the Government and the employers attempt to impose wage cuts against growing resistance from the working class, they will turn ever more frequently to their repressive forces for help.
Two factors rammed home the need for contingency planning. The first was that trade unionists were increasingly adopting direct action tactics. The closing of the Saltley gates by a mass picket while the police stood by helplessly had a major impact on those responsible for internal security.
As Brigadier Brian Watson of the Army General Staff said later: "The whole period of the miners' strike has made us realise that the present size of the police force is too small. It is based on the fundamental philosophy that we are a law-abiding country. have now got to the state where there are not enough resources to deal with the increasing numbers of people who are not prepared to aments Building, Weds 12 respect the law.
The major factor which affected the drawing up of contingency plans was the continuing Irish struggle. This is a factor which Bunyan does not consider in detail, and his book is weaker for its omission.
Ine occupation of the Six Coun ties by the British. Army has several Ana dissent The renewed rise of extra-parlia and espec minds campaign.
The recent development of the Irish sea.
al emergency.
entation.
But things times threatened to tear apart Britain's liberal democratic facade. But while it remains, the Army is gaining experience in countering inter This is why almost every Chief Constable has toured Northern Ireland, and almost every British Army unit has carried out duties there. They learn techniques of riot control, computer surveillance. phone tapping and infiltration of political organisations.
Most importantly for internal defence operations, Northern Ireland has educated the British security forces in how to wage a 'hearts and Essentially, this Involves getung as close to tae unsur gent' population as possible, winning them to support the Government, and isolating the militants. Recent reports that some English police forces are looking into 'community policing' show that the hearts and minds' approach has crossed the This, then, was the background to the formulation of contingency plans for Britain in case of a 'nationBunyan draws together all available information on what is entailed by these plans, and discusses the growing coordination between the police and Army which is necessary for its effective implemThe Heathrow manoeuvres and other joint-police Army operations (including joint weapons train-