new Phalangist allies, rians. It was always conceived in a detens ve manner without putting into question the relationship that the PLO had with other Arab regimes. When Syria attacked, the PLO tried first to work on a diplomatic level, but later had to counter-attack on a military level.
The PLO was put in a situation where either it had to break with its understanding of general Arab bourgeois (including Palestinians) against Israel, or it had to try what it had always tried: to play on the contradictions between the regime which attacked it and the other Arab regimes.
An example is the case of Tel al Zaatar. The PLO leadership concentrated on calling for all the Arab regimes, and especially Egypt, to weaken the Syrian position. This was very bad for the defence of Tel al Zaatar, not only because it weakened the mobilisation of the Lebanese and Palestinian masses, but also because the only chance for the Palestinian movement and the Lebanese masses was to rely on the mass movement in Egypt, Syria and all the Arab countries.
The call for the Arab regimes to help the Palestinians closed the door to the possibility of generating a mass movement in the other Arab coun tries to defend the Palestinian resistance. The PLO did its best not to break with the Arab bourgeoisies, and ultimately they were completely solated before the agreement of the Lebanese and all Arab bourgeoisies, Syria included, against them. This was the practical meaning of nonintervention in the "Arab regimes" internal problems.
What are the positions of the Rejection Front, and how far do they differ from those of other sections of the PLO such as Fatah and Saiqa? How far are there internal differences between the PFLP, the PFLP [General Command] and the Arab Liberation Front?
The three latter organisations united on the question of the rejection of. the Palestinian mini-state proposed by the PLO leadership. But the ALF is different from the other two organisations, in that it is directly built and sponsored by the Iraqi Baathist Before the Syrian intervention one could not make a clear distinction Syrian "Liberators between the policy of the PFLP and the PFLP(GC) and that of the other PLO organisations. Une aLaCK against the resistance in Lebanon, it was seen mat au me Tess arce was threatened, so the question of the mini-state was not directly the problem.
The Rejection Front did not bring alternatives to the PLO's substitutionist, military understanding of the war. Their relationship masses was very similar to Fatah's. Many militants changed from one organisation to SERGENCE making a clear distinction.
When the Syrians attacked, the PFLP didn't follow the line of Fatah in trying to make deals with the Syrian bourgeoisie. It knew that the Syrians would try to attack it more strongly than the other currents in the resistance. The PFLP(GC), the other hand, was divided. One