WE HAVE always argued for the importance of unconditional solidarity with the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) in the struggle of the Nicaraguan people to overthrow Somoza. The out their political force as a basis for radically changing their living conditions.
For this reason we have repeated the call of the Trotskyists inside Nicaragua and elsewhere for the FSLN to take power without the bourgeoisie and to base their government on the development of the popular committees and At the moment the FSLN supports a I lulles. provisional government in which the bourgeois opposition has a voice out of all proportion to its real social • base five-person junta includes only one leader of the FSLN.
This government Latin American allies and the European social-democrats that it will not be another Cuba, and that capital will be secure in any new Nicaragua Sandino the FSLN calls on the develop their own power, and in towns like Leon a completely alternative present regime has been established. So how do we understand or define the FSLN? Ambushed Auguste Cesar Sandino was a liberal leader influenced syndicalism nationalism who led a guerrilla struggle against the US-backed government alter liberal leaders had sold out the 1926 uprising. In 1930 the National Guard was formed to deal with Sandino. chief. After attending a dinner as part of peace negotiations with the government, Sandino was ambushed by Somoza's men and murdered.
The Sandinistas re-emerged in the 1960s under the influence of the Cuban revolution the development political and military bases of operation which could protect the guerrilla, allow attacks on the army, and from which support could gradually Leading Sandinista Doria Maria Tellez in liberated Leon year confidence in this the fighting;
makes SALANCI 'progressive Yet on Radio enriched masses to power to the orientation, and Mexican Ruiz, other Somoza's father was its first wasworking da hence of rural Zero, DANDINISTA Seader Daniel Rodriguez was asked by the Trotskyist paper Combale late last what he thought of the demand for a governinent of the fiSt. Nand the workers and popular organivations. Hereplied:
•I beliese it is unreal. completely unrealistic. It is also out of contest, because it will isolate the front and it will put us in the trap that the imperialists are political hase, reduce our military base. isolate us and then annihilate us.
•The force of the Mandinistas lay in that we were flesible enough to see the necessit! unifying the opposition and through this 1o fortily itself... 4 ÷ 88 e merels a paper one but a real tacrical one that will be used for a determinant stage with all the sectors opposed to the dictatorship...
the representatives provisional government will be from the Group | of Twelve (a pro-t'LN group of capitalists)... this man Robelo C'allejas is a new type ot boss, different trom the classical ones themsehes through regime... thes want a protound change in the institutions of the state.
be built up until the countryside could throttle the cities with a mass popular army.
1974 this prolonged with its downplaying among the urban masses, split followed. Now there were two fronts: Prolonged Popular War (GPP), led by Henry Tamas Borge and Modesto; Proletarian Front. led by Jaime Wheelock.
On 13 October 1977 units of the FLN attacked a barracks at Massaya. militants were killed, but out of this a new front evolved called the Terceristas. This tendency distinguished by its openness strategically the opposition to Somoza. But it also favoured a more militarist, insurrectionist approach sometimes known insurrectionist tendency.
It was the Terceristas, led by commander organised the successful occupation of the National Palace sulllilici released pushing 10,000 dead.
Today, reduce our politics, Junta.
nf Youth an alliance that isn't quickly than arms)
who have links to the popular war degree of work was questioned. A of the September A dozel more reticent. towards bourgeois together with the the Brinceno dramatically working class when Somoza's son was held hostage and all the political prisoners were But they were responsible too for prematurely for ine insurrection In September 1978, which was defeated, leaving although the FSLN has a unified council of the three fronts, it is the Terceristas who have the most weight in terms of national It is their leader, Ortega, who is the only FSLN representative in the provisional The Terceristas have grown much more the other tendencies. because their lack of political definition helped them to get effective support (including 'progressive' regimes like Panama, and partly because their dramatic military exploits make them a pole of LIC youth Several democratic governments in Europe have good links with the Terceristas — hoping to pick up the investment projects in any new regime.
The older GPP front's base is particularly strong in the north of the country, where it had "focos' for many years. It is reported that towns presently occupied by its militants show a high of social organisation However, localised and clandestine tradition limits its More Marxist in its formulations is the Proletarian Front, which is supported by many students. It publicly criticised the adventurism insurrection. openly attacked the negotiations between the FAO (Broad Opposition Front) and Somoza after September, whereas the Terceristas were It was in response to such manoeuvres, out of a concern to develop more of a mass base, that the GPP and the Proletarian Front — sector the Socialist Party formed the United Popular Movement (MPU). The latter's programme did not put forward a socialist perspective, included a whole list of popular and democratic demands (land concessions, includes the old FAO sectors.
of national FSLN, paper El Socialista (13 June): "The FSLN and the the programme of the MPU.
followed them but then capital.' Tactical Two weeks government that, the MPU Chammarro, provisional government leader, with the bourgeoisie in the bourgeoisie.
FSLN as a 'splitting' On the other hand. inhibiting such a tendency. partly has per cent consolidation FSLN and its taking place inside the FSLN occupied towns.
of Somoza.
It also particularly in relauon lo me DORI people) intervention. and formal denunciations practical aid For films, speakers, but TW7 6BE reform, expropriation of Somoza, transformation of the Guard, etc.).
But despite its opposition to the FAO's allowed member organisations to maintain affiliation to both fronts — thereby expressing a strategic unity with the "patriotic' bourgeoisie. Now the MPU is part of the National Patriotic Front, which All tendencies of the FSLN thus accept in one way or another the notion of a government reconstruction the bourgeoisie. Omar Jota Lazo, a leader of the posed it in this way to the Colombian MPU will be majority government. The representatives o the bourgeois opposition will be a definite minority... This minority will be submitted to "The workers movement in Nicaragua Wil never be deceived by the bourgeoisie. The FAC wanted to do it and the people originally they hecame cas conscious. They found out that their struggle was not just against the regime but againsi later the provisional had been the inclusion of an FAO leader - Robeldo. Besides programme is incompatible with a social-democratic regime - though whether a government led by the bourgeoisie could carry out that programme is another question. For example, could Violeta wealthy landowner and , actually lead a radical land reform as favoured by the FSLN' Many Sandinistas argue that the alliance this government is realistic and merely tactical (see statement by Rodriguez printed here). They suggest that it will be the Sandinista-led popular committees and militias who will hold the whip hand over The problem is that unless you say frankly to the masses now that the bosses won't be able to satisfy workers' demands, how will you later be able to convince the people that now you must break with these honest patriots? In fact, once the bourgeoisie have had time to remodel the state institutions it will be easier for them to portray any sudden turn against them by the , anti-nationalist move.
On one side the independent involvement of the masses and changes in the orientation of the FSLN as a result of internal debate are factors encouraging a radical outcome of the situation.
there are strong factors First, the present prevention of a total military victory by the Sandinistas gives the US more room to create an 'interim government' which could achieve a ceasefire and form a new backed with the carrot of massive aid, which could marginalise the FSLN (or at least its more hardline sectors).
Secondly, the devastating social dislocation of the war and social structure of Nicaragua (with the working class forming only about 20 population) makes the of sell-organisation more difficult. Finally, the political tradition of the relatively small number political cadres mean that it could be disarmed totally in accepting a democratic stage.
Present information makes it difficult to gauge exactly the level of self-organisation of the masses, and the sort of political debates and within the But what is clear is that there will be no possibility whatsoever of developing a working class solution without the overthrow Therefore we need to maintain solidarity, demand emergency aid to the refugees (who don't seem to merit the sort of media coverage given to the and US These solidarity demands should be raised within the Labour Party and the TUC with the aim of forcing them to translate their of Somoza into , leaflets etc. contact Central American Human Rights Committee 59a Church Street, Old Isleworth, Middlesex Socialist Challenge 12 July 1979 Page 9
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Refugees perhaps