TAN Smith with the former Foreign Secretary, David Owen, who backed the Anglo-American proposals for Zimbabwe. But BEFORE the election Francis Pym was only vagucly aware that the Labour government's policy on Zimbabwe was also that of the United States, or so Godfrey Hodgson reported in the New Statesman.
If this is to be believed (and it sounds very plausible) it is a for Margaret TE TELL hatcher's appointment Lord Carrington to the Foreign Office.
He at least, with his extensive South African and Rhodesian business interests, will be in possession of such vital pieces of information as where the countries in question are and the tact that the Anglo-American settlement proposals Zimbabwe are Angle American.
So if Carrington lends the British government into direct conflict with its American ally over southern Africa it will at least be consciously. But will he?
A lot of mystification and plain slander surrounds the issue of British policy Zimbabwe. The Anglo-American proposals launched Dy Foreign LOVES and American Ambassador Andrew Young in September 1977 differ only slightly from the "internal settlement" o1 the Rhodesian regime.
In essence they are the same: police, armed forces, judiciary By Richard Carver and the entire settler machinery would remain in power with only the political forms changed. Even thos political forms are not different: 28 Teserved white seats the settlement, Owen-Young plan.
The cause of the disagreement is simple: settlement include the Patriotic Front led by Joshua Nkomo and sooch MusaocE En Inc imperialist camp residual racist objections are put because it is recognised that a and herefore proteste leF the majority black party is involved.
lan Smith is prepared to take the psychologically important also sinister win turnine minister condition that he can sell this to his white settler supporters. But white farming interests, which stil form the social hase of the Smith regime, gently opposed to any deal with the Patriotic Front.
The Tory dilemma is that every instinct tells them to back Smith while their political sense tells them that the Owen-Young plan is in imperialisa's best UN interests.
The appointment of Carrington is significant because his own personal experience and Interests in southern Africa will tend to make him perfectly attuned to imperialism's needs. He is a cool operator who is | internal the should the aside only are intransi unlikely to let solidarity with his 'kith and kin override his duty to his class.
Unless Thatcher want to preside ove the curly disintegration of the Commonwcalth they will not velo probable United Nations economic sanctions imposed on South Africa over Namibia.
And they recognise the Smith regime before the August Commonwealth conference. mindful not just of future they're not so different from the 'internal settlement".
and Nigeria too;
US Congress and Senate.
will not move to Helms and Sam have opposed They are economic interests in Zim- | Rhodesian elections. babwe but of present ones in black African countries like The extent to which this policy changes is likely to depend on the advances made by the racist right wing in the This group, led by peopic like Jesse Hayakawa, the Anglo- great American plan all along and have gained ground over the question of recognition of the | political crisis over Zimbabwe.
73443 correspon closely with mainstream Tor thought and if they inflict a serious defeat on the Carter administration Britain and the could mOVe forward in step towards a compromise with Smith If this scenario proves wrong - and it is not predicted with confidence both British and US administrations face the prospect of a domestic Recognition of the racist could up enormous opposition among the black and labour moveunoterdents on ar international issue since Vietnam. to avoid sac densi Thatcher and Carrington will have to risk the taunts of the loony right inside their own party Bither. way • Zimbabwe's Rhodesian problem has come home where it belongs.