THE Tory government faces its first political crisis because anything Westminster but as a result of a vote several thousand miles away. The US Senate's decision to recommend lifting Rhodepropels southern African conflict quicker than they wanted.
The vote is not binding on the President, who continues with his policy of all-party talks in Zimbabwe, but particularly given the Enormous 13-19 administration's margin for manoeuvre.
The motion was the work of two right-wing senators, Republican Sam Hayakawa and Democrat Jesse Helms. Hayakawa had previously enlisted the support of liberal Democrat George McGovern to press for official US team observers for the April internal settlement' this was not fortbcoming they organised their own observers predictably discovered that the elections were 'free and fair'.
Helms and Hayakawa have long been the leaders of the pro-Rhodesia lobby. It was Hayakawa who organised lan Smith's visit to the United States last October.
For the moment administration will avoid LASHEL INCHECHE Senate decision by claiming to operate within the terms of the Case-Javits amendment to the 1978 Security Assistance Act. This says that sanctions will be dropped when the Smith regime agrees to ali-party talks (that is, including the Patriotic Front nationalist organisations) and when a new government has beca freely elected participation of political sroups.
The two liberal Republicans who proposed the amendment woeded it in such a way as to allow the administration great for effectively allows Carter choose when and how recognises a new government in Zimbabwe — at the same time appearing lasting political principles.
This is important for the US President because his policy is determined not by the need for government Zimbabwe but by what is the best way to establish a stable, pro-imperialist sufficient miss support stand a chance of survival.
How to achieve this has exercised the minds of Capitol Hill policy makers throughout their term. There has been a running disagreement administration between "Africanists" such Ambassador Andrew Young. who argue for broad-based political solutions, and global strategists' like National Security Adviser Zbigniew BrzerinSki who present a harder line on the need to resist the Soviet qualitative tilt in the balance of forces in its favour.
volve the er on Involve the overturn capitalism in the region. As in Angola and Western investment will be safe. Hut h would strengmen the band of regimes identify SUITS the leadership, thus imperialism's strategic position Equally importantly "Soviet threat" shorthand for a process which has nothing to the ary upsurge of the black masses of southern Africa. From the US point of view this has to be dealt repression or integration the better way?
Repression has been
used the military method in Angola, just as it used it against the Soweto students. In neither did it work.
When using - against population of Zimbabwe with equally disastrous results.
hopes that there is a better way. Andrew Young was dead right when he commented *President Carter understands it a lot better than does the Senate!
The Senate defeat neverthethe less puts a fairly short time limit Canter EnLI attempts he to in UN -Patriotis Front t similar restrictions on the Tory KOTORECL Thatcher and her Foreign Minister Lord Mozambique, Throughout campaign even the liberal wing which or me ones soch as Franc Soviet Pym. breathed brimstone government's Rhodesia policy, which was identical to that of the the Americans, The demands is a useful of office, however. require them do with the somethina more bracical.
We predicted last week that the Tories would not immedi Is placer ately when Carrington the clection fire and wealth leaders, Labour prediction.
company imperialism's move to recognise the first. Smith Mazorewa government The absolute carliest they could do that would be after the Commonwealth conference in August and then only if there had been substantial political changes in Zimbabwe and in the attitude of black Common- policy to Nothing that has happened in the past week alters that Carrington probably the most able member al the wovernment and himsel providing director substantial southern African interests, can be relied on to put best interests heid Movement to allow the Thatcher berself has little pretence to foreign policy formulation and already seems prepared to defer to Carrington's judgement.
The problem they now have however, is tosell their cautiou:
the more bovine sections of the backbenches for whom extreme racism is an article of faith. The Senate decision makes things more difficult for Thatcher backbenchers with ammunition.
So does the report of the Tory team of observers of the April elections, released this week. The report says that the clections were free and fair and the government to recognise the Smith-Muzorewa the Tory leadership decides to ignore thar advice it still faces the problem of howto reach an acceptable compromise with Smith. The prospec of all-party talks is dim as long as the white regime is trying to bomb the Patriotic Front into oblivion. Instead both Washingion and London will step up its strategy of trying to split the Patniotic Front.
It is noticeable that the British press has become softer towards ZANU leader Rober Mugabe, who has less firm international alignments than ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and would therefore, so the rcasoning goes, be more ready to seek new allie Saith himself sees the value of this strategy, referring to Mugabe as a 'very realistic and sensible person who is playing with Marxism as a matter of convenience Zbigniew Brzezinski even tried to get the Chinese leaders to use their influence with Mugabe to get him to join th internal settlement. Mugab his never indicated the slightest willngness to go along with this plan, if for no other reason than the cynical one that people leave to join the losers.
Mugahe's announcernent last week of the growing unity between the two Patriotic Front parties is a welcome indication that the split strategy has little hope in the foresceable future